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This thesis uses statistical analysis methods and
subjective decisions to determine the parameters necessary
to establish crew selection criteria for the AH-64 attack
helicopter. The purpose of establishing these parameters is
to aid the Army in establishing pilot selection criteria for
the AH-64.
The techniques of simple linear regression and
nonparametric statistics indicated that the greater the
experience level the better performance level achieved. The
analysis of crews determined that less experienced crews
performed proportionately as well as the more experienced
crews. Curiously, the amount of experience of the pilot is
not a determining factor, whereas the copilot gunners exper-
ience is directly related to how well the crew performed.
Crew selection for the AH-6U helicopter should be made from
the existing AH-1 series community of aviators with the more





II. PILOT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE AAH TEST 10
III. ANALYSIS OF TEST AVIATORS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
AVIATION NORM 14
IV. EVALUATION OF AIRCREWS AND RESEARCH METHOD .... 17
A. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE AH -64 AIRCREWS 19
1. Results of Multidimensional Contingency
Table Analysis of Trial, Valley and
Crew (Day Trials) 22
2. Results of Multidimensional Contingency
Table Analysis of Trial, Valley and
Crew (Night Trials) 24
B. ANALYSIS OF AUTONOMOUS HELLFIRE MISSILE
SYSTEM 25
V. ANALYSIS OF CREW PERFORMANCE 26
A. COPILOT GUNNER ANALYSIS OF MOE 29
VI. CONCLUSIONS 36
APPENDIX A: AVIATOR COMPARISON TABLES 40
APPENDIX 3: MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTINGENCY TABLE
ANALYSIS (DAY TRIALS) 45
APPENDIX C: MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTINGENCY TABLES
(NIGHT TRIALS) 54
APPENDIX D: CORRELATION TABLES 60
APPENDIX E: CREW PERFORMANCE DATA SUMMARY 66
APPENDIX F: CHI -SQUARED TEST EXAMPLE 67

APPENDIX G: SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ... 68
BIBLIOGRAPHY 70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 71

I. INTRODUCTION
The Army conducts operational tests on equipment to
determine the feasibility of a new system. Feasibility is
determined during the Demonstration and Validation of
alternatives phase of a systems development. OT's are
conducted to test the operational suitability, military
utility, and operational effectiveness of the system. OT I
tests are to determine potential operational suitability
and effectiveness and OT II tests demonstrate operational
suitability, military utility, and operational effective-
ness leading to the production decision.
To adequately test the new system in an operational
environment a tactical unit is tasked to put the new system
through a rigorous tactically oriented test. This method
enables the Army to evaluate the tactical employment
feasibility and whether an active duty unit can operate,
maintain, and employ the new system in a tactical
environment .
The unit chosen to participate in the operational test
is supposed to be a typical Army unit. The range of
experience and expertise should mirror the current level of
training in the Army. In this way, if the new system is
purchased and deployed , no special criteria will have to be
established to field the new system.

The Advanced Attack Helicopter Test (AAH) design was in
accordance with the above doctrine. D Company, 7th Combat
Aviation Battalion was the tactical unit chosen to partici-
pate in the test. The unit was required to fly and
maintain the AH-64 for a period of 90 days in a tactical
environment. Fort Hunter-Liggett was selected as the test
site; it is situated in the mountainous coastal region of
middle California and offers a myriad of terrain which
closely approximates Western Europe. D Company conducted
all operations in a field environment under the control of
its chain of command. Test requirements were passed
through the chain of command to add realism to the scenario
and to maintain tactical integrity of the unit. This was
the environment in which the AAH test was conducted.
A. PURPOSE
This thesis measures subjective versus objective
decisions involved in the pilot selection for the AH-64
operational test. It is intended to provide a method of
selection of pilots for the AH-64 using other than
statistical inference as a measure of experience.
Experience is measured in many different ways;
maturity, common sense, adaptability, and expertise. It is
essential that all these elements be weighed so the
selection process provides the most qualified individuals.
The initial selection process for the Advance Attack

Helicopter Test was in accordance with the operational test
plan and current Army regulations. The selection, however,
was overturned by TRADOC and the Program Manager. These
agencies wanted a minimum flight hour requirement placed on
those pilots selected to fly the AH-64. The participating
unit did not have sufficient pilots to cover the flight
hour requirement; thus, pilots from outside the unit had to
be brought in to supplement the unit. The pilots chosen
were supposed to mirror the experience level of Army
aviators; however, the hourly requirement restriction put
the AH-64 pilots in an arena by themselves. These pilots
far exceeded the experience of the normal Army aviators,
and in fact, were more closely associated with the more
experienced instructor pilot population. The difference
between the AH-64 population and the normal population will
be measured to show that flight hours are not the only
means of measuring an individual's quality and performance
level; rather, a subjective measure of his ability to adapt
to a new environment is equally important.

II. PILOT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE AAH TEST
Pilot selection for the Advanced Attack Helicopter Test
began in August 1980. D Company was chosen as the opera-
tional unit to conduct the test. The commander was
notified of the test requirements and tasked to provide
pilots to participate in the test.
The test required 14 pilots in seven two man crews.
Six crews would participate in the test with the seventh
crew being an alternate. Each crew would fly the AH-13
helicopter and the new helicopter, the AH-64. A pilot
would occupy either the front (copilot/gunner) or the back
(pilot) seat throughout the test. A crew member would not
interchange pilot stations. The AH-1S helicopter, which is
the most advanced attack helicopter in the Army today,
would be used as a base line helicopter to measure the
combat effectiveness of the AH-64. Having the same crews
flying both helicopters eliminated crew proficiency and
experience as a testing parameter. The process allowed the
test evaluators to hold crew proficiency constant and
measure just the level of performance of the helicopters.
The crews were selected from a universe of 20 AH-1S
pilots. Three pilots within the universe were eliminated
because of their duty positions; the commander, executive
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officer, and operations officer. These individuals' duty
position required their full attention, thus their
participation in the test would be limited to those
operational requirements implied by their position.
The commander and operations officer selected the 14
pilots from the remaining universe. They selected crews
based on experience, ability, adaptability, combat sense,
and maturity. They then selected crew members which
complemented each other
;
pairing strengths and weaknesses
in order to provide a typical attack helicopter crews.
The first pilot selection went forward on 15 September
1981 to the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA)
for approval. OTEA, the component agency responsible for
evaluating the test results, worked in conjunction with the
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the AAH Project
Manager (PM) . These agencies evaluated the pilot selection
submitted by the unit. The PM felt the crews did not have
sufficient flight hours to handle the new helicopter and
convinced OTEA and TRADOC to place a minimum hourly
requirement of 1000 total flight hours and 500 AH-1 hours.
Additionally, pressure from the Aviation Safety Center and
the PM was placed on OTEA to change the single crew concept
to dedicated AH-1S and AH-64 crews. The PM and Aviation
Safety Center felt the crews could not adequately handle




The new pilot requirements were sent to the unit on 1
October 1980. The commander was required to increase the
total pilot universe from which he could draw, to accom-
modate the new requirement of 12 AH-1S and 12 AH-64 pilots.
This was accomplished by adding 4 pilots from other units.
Of the 24 pilots available, only nine met the hourly
requirements. The commander, operations officer and
battalion S-3 comprised three of the nine pilots. Because
of their operational duties they were not considered. The
commander decided to include the remaining six qualified
pilots, and six additional pilots who he felt were totally
capable of performing the mission with the same level of
expertise as the qualified pilots.
A meeting was scheduled on 8 October 1980 to discuss
the pilot selection and test design. Pilot selection was
the major topic of discussion. The unit's pilot list was
submitted for approval to TRADOC. Each pilot was discussed
individually, using a performance profile designed by the
unit commander. The list and profile were sent to OTEA and
the PM for final approval. Both organizations rejected
four of the pilots because of their flight hour
deficiencies .
The commissioned officer platoon leader, whom the
commander felt was an absolute necessity, was not approved.
The commander felt that a commissioned aviator platoon
12

leader qualified in the AH-64 was the only effective way to
train the platoon as an effective combat fighting unit.
Without this qualified platoon leader there would not be an
effective leader who fully understood the system and how to
tactically employ the system. This argument was also
rejected and the unit was left four AH-64 pilots short.
Of the eight pilots approved by OTEA and the PM , two
did not meet the minimum requirements. However, these
pilots were acceptable because they were only 200 hours
short of the total time requirement and exceeded the attack
helicopter hourly requirement. The AH-1S pilots did not
have to meet the hourly requirements and, thus, were filled
from the remaining AH-1S pilots assigned to D Co
.
The PM controlled the developmental test pilots who had
conducted the first series of tests on the AH-64 and its
related systems. He proposed that the remaining pilots
come from this agency. TRADOC accepted this proposal; the
remaining pilots would come from the Developmental Test and
Training Detachment (DTTD). The final crew selection was
approved 1 November 1980. D Company would provide eight
pilots for the AH-64 and ten pilots for the AH-1S, and DTTD




III. ANALYSIS OF TEST AVIATORS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
AVIATION NORM
The question of whether the AH-64 and AH-1S aircrew
members in the Advanced Attack Helicopter Test were typical
of Army attack helicopter aircrew members with respect to
flight hours was investigated. AH-1S aircrew members were
typical of Army attack helicopter aircrew members while
AH-64 aircrew members were considerably more experienced,
and closely resembled instructor pilots and standardization
instructor pilots.
This analysis was intended to answer the following
question: How typical, or atypical, of Army attack
helicopter pilots were the aircrew members who participated
as crew members in the AH-64 and AH-1S in the Advanced
Attack Helicopter Test? Since the point of the analysis
was typicality, with respect to capability as attack heli-
copter pilots and copilot gunners, measures of experience
in flying and fighting helicopters were considered
appropriate .
Accordingly, data was gathered on the twelve AH-64 and
twelve AH-1S aircrew members who participated in the




Total Rotary Wing Flight Hours
Total Combat Rotary Wing Flight Hours
Total Rotary Wing Instructor Pilot Hours
Total Flight Hours in AH-1 Series Helicopter
Total Rotary Wing Flight Hours and Total Combat Rotary Wing
Flight Hours were available from a sample of 222 AH-1
qualified aircrew members, gathered in 1978 from attack
helicopter units at Fort Ord, Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, and
Fort Bragg. Data on all the variables listed above were
obtained from Flight Standardization Division, Directorate
of Evaluation and Standardization, US Army Aviation Center,
Fort Rucker. Additionally, Fort Rucker provided data on
all the above variables for 292 instructor pilots in attack
helicopters. This is virtually the total population of
AH-1 series instructor pilots in the Army. Comparisons of
the flight hour variables were then made among these four
groups, utilizing non-parametric statistical tests since
the distributions were far from normal.
Median and mean values of the flight hour variables for
each of the four groups are presented in Appendix A, Table
1. From this table it can be seen that (based on median
values) the AH-1S aircrew members have the fewest hours of
all flight hour variables, followed in order by the 222
AH-1 qualified aircrew members (1978), the 292 instructor
pilots (1981), and the AH-64 aircrew members. Further, it
15

may be noted that the AH-1S aircrew members are similar to
the 222 AH-1 qualified aircrew members (1973), while the
AH-64 aircrew members are similar to the 292 instructor
pilots ( 1 981 )
.
The results of the non-parametric statistical tests of
the difference among the groups of aircrew members are
shown in Appendix A. All of these statistical tests were
Mann-Whitney two tailed tests, with the exception of those
comparing the 222 AH-1 qualified aircrew members with the
292 instructor pilots , which were two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two tailed tests. Since none of the statistical
tests of differences among the groups of aircrew members
were significant for total flight hours in the AH-1 series
helicopters, these tests are not shown. The results of the
statistical tests support the conclusion that the AH-64
aircrew members in the Advanced Attack Helicopter Test were
essentially similar to the AH-1 series instructor pilots in
Array attack helicopter units, while the AH-1S aircrew
members were essentially similar to Army attack helicopter
aircrew members. This support was clearcut in the cases of
Total Rotary Wing Hours and Total Rotary Wing Instructor
Pilot Flight Hours, and suggestive, but less clear cut in
the case of Total Combat Rotary Wing Hours.
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IV. EVALUATION OF AIRCREWS AND RESEARCH METHOD
This section will present an analysis of AH-64 crew
performances observed during July 1981 through August 1981.
The analysis is based on validated AH-64 engagement data
provided by OTEA. The analysis considered only Force-on-
Force data from trials which were determined to be
representative (the data reflected what actually took place
and the battle was not shaped by any outside influences.
No major anomalies occurred which caused the battle to be
improperly shaped) or marginally representative (the data
reflected what actually took place, however, an anomally
existed which may have caused the battle to be improperly
influenced) by the testing agency. The data was parti-
tioned into two groups according to whether it occurred
before or after the instrumented training day on 30 July
1981. The reason for this division was due to the
inconsistencies and deviations in tactical standing
operating procedures (TSOP) by the test players prior to
the instrumented training day. Trials conducted after 30
July 1981 were felt to be much more representative of
attack helicopter tactical operations. Prior to this date
crew coordination was adequate but team coordination, (the
integration of multiple crews), was poor. This can be
17

attributed to the lack of leadership within the AH-64
platoon. As noted earlier, OTEA had scrapped the idea of
qualifying a platoon leader in the AH-64 because the
individual did not meet the minimum flight hour require-
ment. In my opinion the problems with discontinuity and
poor early performance are directly related to the absence
of the qualified platoon leader.
Experience of the AH-64 crew members in the early
trials was a deterrent instead of an advantage. Each crew
felt they had the correct employment method and instead of
working together they performed operations as individual
crews fighting the battle instead of performing as a
member of a larger team. This was not the case in later
trials; crew performance increased proportionately, nor was
this the case in the AH-1S base line platoon. The crew
members in the base line platoon worked exceptionally well
together and in the trials prior to 30 July 1981 they
continually outperformed the AH-64 crew members. Unfor-
tunately, time constraints precluded sufficient testing of
the base line platoon crew members so test data on their
performance level is based on exploratory trials and
subjectivity. Because of the lack of adequate test data on
the AH-1S base line platoon only the crew members of the
AH-64 platoon will be evaluated. A point of interest would
have been the analysis of the less experienced AH-1S
18

platoon and the AH-64 platoon to determine the performance
ratio. This point should be considered in future tests.
A. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AH-64
AIRCREWS
The measure of effectiveness used in the analysis of
crew performance was selected to reflect the crew's ability
to "put steel on target". Each autonomous simulated
Hellfire launch was reviewed by the testing agency and an
outcome was determined to be either an assessment against
the target or a miss. The following ratio was used to show
the success of the crew.
Crew Performance
_
number of Autonomous Missile Assessments
Success Ratio ~ Total number of Autonomous Missile Launches
Two separate analyses were conducted to establish the
multidimensional contingency table analysis used to analyze
the missile launch success ratio. The first was conducted
to investigate any possible differences between those
trials which occurred before 30 July 1981 and those that
occurred after that date, the two valleys, and the two crew
types (those crews from DTTD and those from D. Co. 7th
CAB) . This analysis utilized only those trials which
occurred during the day. The second analysis examined
differences between valleys and crews for the night trials.
19

In both of the analyses the six aircrews were categorized
as either DTTD (2) or D Co. 7th CAB (4) aircrews.
Included in the assessment total are those assessments
made as a result of post trial review. Credit was given
for an assessment during post trial if the onboard AH-64
video showed the correct conditions and sight picture for a
successful engagement. Targets which continued to move
after being assessed as "dead" in the real time casualty
assessment (RTCA) process were also analyzed in post trial
for inclusion into the success count. The table below




Total Real Time Post Trial
Launches Assessme nts Assessments






The proportion of crew successes in later trials is








Early Trials 35 40
Later Trials 69 27
The data in the above table was summarized by combining
successes and failures of all crews in each trial category.
The reasons for the increase were directly attributed to
changes made by the test players in response to leadership
changes. The crews responded to their poor early perfor-
mance by changing the engagement methods from singular
crews to a team effort. The later trials portray a unit
which conforms to a more realistic attack helicopter
environment
.
The proportion of DTTD crew successes in later trials
and night trials was significantly higher than the D Co.
crew successes in those same trials.
Table 4-3
HMMS Launch Success/Failure for Unit
Later (Day) Night
Successes Failures Successes Failures
DTTD 45 7 39 4
D Co. 24 20 36 12
21

Again, the data in the above table was summarized by
combining successes and failures for each crew's parent
organization in each trial category. A probable explana-
tion for the differences lies with the DTTD copilot gunners
(CPG), each having 110 hours of TADS time versus the D Co.
crews each having only 30 hours of experience with the
TADS. Appendix D Figure 1 shows a graph depicting the
relationship between performance and hours. Other reasons
may be related to experience, combat time. Pilot Night
Vision System (PNVS) time, and Time in Service (TIS) .
Initially, however, the performance between crews (DTTD and
D Co.) in the early trials was less dramatic. This can be
attributed directly to D Co . ' s familiarity with the terrain
and the tactical training they had undergone versus DTTD '
s
sterile administrative flying and lack of current tactical
training .
1
. Results of Multid imensional Con t_i_n_g e_n_c_y__T a b_l e
Analysis of Trial, Valley and Crew TPay TrialsT
The results of the analysis are presented in
Appendix B, Table 1. Inspection of the results indicates
several significant differences among factors. First is a
difference between trials. As indicated in Appendix 3,
Table 2 the percent of successful launches is higher (72%
vs. 47%) for those trials which occurred after 30 July 1981
than those trials which occurred prior to that date. The
difference between valleys can be observed in Appendix 3,
22

Table 3. There is a significantly higher percent of
successful engagements in the Gabilan Valley than in the
Nacimiento Valley (68% vs. 47%). The significant differ-
ence between the crews is presented in Appendix B, Table 4.
DTTD crews had a success rate of 84% compared to the 46%
achieved by D Co. crews. Of particular interest are the
two significant interactions. The valley and crew
interaction presented in Appendix B, Table 5, and Figure 1.
It is evident that DTTD crews exhibited more of a differ-
ence between valleys (92% Gabilan vs. 50% Nacimiento) than
did D Co. crews (47% Gabilan vs. 46% Nacimiento). An
explanation for this difference is that the Gabilan
provided better fields of fire than did the Nacimiento and
that the DTTD crews had greater familiarity with the TADS.
Trial vs. Valley vs. Crew interaction is presented in
Appendix B, Table 6 and Figure 2. There is a larger
indicated difference between trials for DTTD crews in the
Nacimiento (20%, 30 July 1981 and before, vs. 48% after
that date) and D Co. crews in the Gabilan valley (38%, 30
July 1981 and before, vs. 63% after that date) than found
amongst DTTD crews in the Gabilan valley (100%, 30 July
1981 and before, vs. 91% after that date) and D Co. crews
in the Nacimiento (43%, 30 July 1981 and before, vs. 48%
after that date). Again, this difference can be directly
attributed to DTTD's experience with the TADS and lack of
23

current tactical training. As noted earlier, DTTD crews
did not work well during the early trials because of their
inability to work as team members. This short-coming was
overcome in later trials and their performance level
increased accordingly. Whereas D Co. crews had worked as a
unit for some time and thus were used to working together
in tactical situations.
2. Results of Multidimensional Contingency Table
Analysis of Trial, Valley and Crew (Night Trials)
The results of the analysis are presented in
Appendix C, Table 1. Inspection of the results indicates
several significant differences among factors. The first
is a difference between valleys, as indicated in Appendix
C, Table 3. The percent of successful launches is higher
(91% vs. 69%) in the Nacimiento valley than in the Gabilan
valley. Also present is a valley versus crew interaction.
This is presented in Appendix C, Table 2, and Figure 1. It
is evident that the D Co. crews exhibited more of a differ-
ence between valleys (56%, Gabilan vs. 96%, Nacimiento)
than did the DTTD crews (100%, Gabilan vs. 88%,
Nacimiento). Again, the reason for the greater success of
the DTTD crews can be directly related to their experience
with the TADS and the AH-64.
24

B. ANALYSIS OF AUTONOMOUS HELLFIRE MISSILE SYSTEM
This analysis determined the relationship between
the percent of successful simulated autonomous HMMS
launches for each of six aircrews and various flight crew
parameters. The number of successful simulated autonomous
HMMS launches were calculated for each of the six aircrews
(2 of the crews are DTTD and 4 are D Co.). Only those
trials which occurred after 30 July 1981 were used in this
calculation. From these tabulations a "percent of simu-
lated autonomous HMMS launches which were successful" ratio
was obtained for each crew. This ratio was then correlated
using simple linear regression with various flight crew
parameters; (for both the pilot and copilot gunner), total
flight time, total flight time in attack helicopters (AH-1
series), total flight time in the AH-64, total combat
flight time, total instructor pilot (IP) or standardization
instructor pilot (SIP) flight time, and average test scores
in ground school. Each parameter was correlated with
successful autonomous HMMS launches to determine if there
are measures which best describe the characteristics
required to perform pilot or copilot gunner duties in the
AH-64. Those analyses which yielded relevent results are
discussed in Chapter 5 and in Appendix D.
25

V. ANALYSIS OF CREW PERFORMANCE
This section will draw on the performance levels of
each aircrew and the relationship of their experience with
their performance to determine any significant correlation
between crew performance and individual data. The table
below shows the combined results of the data used in










Crew HMMS Launch Success Ratio







The proportion of crew successes in the Gabilan valley
during the later trials was significantly higher than the



















The table above shows the combined successes and failures
for all crews for a particular valley. There was not a
significant difference in crew successes between valleys
during the night trials. A possible explanation for this



















Autonomous HMMS Launch by Crew
Later Trials






The major differences can be explained by the valley's
physical disposition; the Nacimiento is heavily wooded,
whereas the Gabilan is open rolling terrain. The
Nacimiento lends itself to remote shots and the Gabilan to
autonomous shots
.
There was a significant difference in the types of
launches between the two valleys. This was possibly due
to the Gabilan valley offering good autonomous flanking
shots along the entire western edge of the valley, whereas
the Nacimiento valley was more conducive to air and ground
remote launches. Additionally, the proportion of DTTD
launches was significantly higher in Gabilan valley versus
the Nacimiento valley. With the DTTD crews firing a very
high success ratio this might affect the results in the
Nacimiento since the DTTD autonomous opportunities in that
valley were significantly less. Further analysis of DTTD
launches reinforced the explanation of the Gabilan valley
28

being used more for autonomous shots and the Nacimiento









The use of remote launches by DTTD can be directly
attributed to the copilot-gunner. The two DTTD copilot-
gunners were the Army's test pilots during Developmental
Testing. They worked exclusively with the AH-64 and its
related systems for a year prior to the test. Their
familiarity with the system provided a distinct advantage
to their employment concepts and success ratio.
A. COPILOT GUNNER ANALYSIS OF MOE
Since there was no significant difference between the
.
later trials and the night trials, based upon the MOE used,
only the copilot gunner characteristic data will be con-
sidered for association with the MOE. The copilot gunner
has probably 95% control over whether a launch will be
successful. Even though the pilot has a demanding workload
in flying at night, once a firing position has been
29

occupied, the launch cycle rests with the copilot gunner.
Therefore, the correlations developed in this section focus
entirely on the copilot gunners. A non-parametric test was
chosen to measure the degree of association between the
performance ranks of the crew with various copilot gunner
data such as experience, education, and training scores.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (r ) was used to
measure this degree of association. It can vary from +1.0
to -1.0, with numbers close to +1.0 indicating a strong
positive association and numbers close to -1.0 a strong
negative association. Numbers close to indicate no
association. In addition, a test of the significance of
the Spearman correlation coefficient was made for each
conclusion using a = .10. Even though the sample size of 6
is small, this non-parametric test is designed for such
samples. Appendix D provides a detailed correlation
analysis of all parameters.
Crew performance and copilot gunner time in service are





CPG Time in Service (TIS)
Crew
Crew Performance Rank CPG ITS (months) CPG TIS Rank11 157 2
2 2 185 1
3 5 48 5
4 3 108 4
5 4 147 3
6 6 42 6
The data suggests a fairly strong positive association
between the performance MOE and the time in service of the
CPG. The TIS rank, also, significantly correlates with
r = 1 . or a perfect positive correlation, with CPG months
on flying status. This would tend to suggest that more
experienced aviators perform better as copilot gunners than
less experienced, which is a very common sense type result.
However, it must be noted that the experience of the DTTD
copilot gunners will bias the outcome of the test results
and a more interesting analysis would be to evalute the
performance of the D Co. crews separately.
Another result related to the experience factor is the
association between performance and the number of months a
CPG has been assigned to an attack helicopter unit. As
expected, there exists a significant positive correlation
31

of .328 between the performance data and the number of
months a copilot-gunner has been assigned to an attack
helicopter unit. This would be as expected since longer
TIS aviators will probably have more opportunities for time
in attack helicopter units than low TIS aviators. The
following table shows the rank of CPG's in relationship to
total time assigned to attack helicopter units.
Table 5-7










1 1 130 2
2 2 173 1
3 5 26 6
4 3 96 4
5 4 140 3
6 6 28 5
Crew performance and the amount of CPG flight hours during




CPG Total Flight Hours Last 12 Months
Crew Crew Performance CPG FLT Hrs FLT Hrs Rank11 95 5
2 2 126 3
3 5 130 2
4 3 113 4
5 4 158 1
6 6 45 6
This is a misleading result; the DTTD copilot gunners were
involved in the AH-64 developmental testing during the
preceding 12 months. Their entire flight experience for
that time was in the AH-64; whereas, the D Co. copilot
gunners were flying the AH-1S. Crew performance and CPG
point target weapon system (PTWS) exam results are
significantly correlated with r = .985.
Table 5-9








1 1 100 1
2 2 98.5 2.5
3 5 91.5 5
4 3 98.5 2.5
5 4 94.8 4
6 6 89.8 6
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An almost perfect positive correlation exists among
this data. The PTWS exam average was computed from the
results of the contractor training program examinations 3
and 4 which dealt exclusively with the Target Acquisition
and Detection System (TADS), switchology, symbology, and
the Integrated Helmet and Display Sight system (IHADSS)
which are crucial to the operation of the Hellfire system.
It should be noted that the copilot-gunners in Crews 1 and
2 had received extensive training and experience previously
during developmental testing of the helicopter. Crew
performance and copilot gunner civilian education are not




Crew Per formance Rank Civ Ed (yr s) Ed Rank
1 1 14 3.5
2 2 14 3.5
3 5 13 5
4 3 18 1
5 4 16 2
6 6 12 6
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Although the correlation coefficient showed a positive
correlation, it was not significant for the size of the
sample. However, the significance test was very close to
a = . 1 and consideration should be given to this factor if
a larger sample can be obtained. Crew performance and
copilot gunner terrain flight hours are not significantly
correlated. (r = .542)
Table 5-11

















This result is much like the previous one in which the
coefficient is positive and the significance level was
close to .1, but not in the rejection region. However,
consideration probably should be given to this factor since




The six crews which constituted the AH-64 test base do
not mirror the typical Army aviator. The two DTTD crews
(crew 1 and 2) have been involved with the AH-64 and its
related systems from the beginning of the program. These
crews are highly experienced aviators whose performance
should, by design, be better than the average Army crew.
In fact, each DTTD crew member is an Instructor Pilot or
Standardization Instructor Pilot with an average total
flight time of 4100 hours and an average total AH-1 series
flight time of 2500 hours. As noted in Appendix A, Table 1
these hours far exceed the AH-1 Qualified pilots and the
AH-1 Instructor Pilot community.
Discounting the DTTD crews, the D Co. crews provide a
much more interesting analysis from which to choose crew
members for the AH-64 helicopter. Their average total
flight time is 1982 hours and their average total AH-1
flight time is 686 hours which places them between the AH-1
qualified community and the Instructor Pilot community.
D Co. copilot gunners average total flight time is 34?
hours and their average total AH-1S flight time is 680
hours. The copilot gunner hours are less than that of the
Army AH-1 qualified community.
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Crews 4 and 5 consisted of a maintenance officer, a
safety officer, an instructor pilot and an operational
pilot. This is a strange mix for crews but does bring into
light an interesting analogy. These aviators do not mirror
the tactical and flying experience of the average Army
attack helicopter pilot. In a typical attack helicopter
unit, the maintenance officer and safety officer seldom fly
in tactical training situations. They are more apt to
perform administrative missions which correspond to their
duty positions. These pilots were the copilot gunners for
crews 4 and 5, whose performance ranks were 3 and 4
respectively.
Crew 3 consisted of an instructor pilot in the back
seat and a 700 hour pilot as the copilot gunner. With the
experience of the back seater and the lack of experience of
the copilot gunner they were able to move to their firing
positions without being detected but had difficulty in the
engagement sequence. Crew 3 is probably the most typical
crew in the test and they achieved a 5^% success ratio
being ranked 5.
Crew 6 consisted of a 3000 hour back seater who had
less than 500 hours AH-1 attack helicopter time and in fact
had spent the majority of his career flying CH-47 heavy
lift helicopters. The copilot gunner was the lowest time
aviator with less than 600 hours total time. With the lack
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of experience of both pilots their performance rank was 6
with a success ratio of 31%.
What is important from this brief description of the
D Co. pilot history of the crews is, no matter what their
prior experience level was, they were able to perform
within the design constraints of the system. They
performed to the level expected commensurate with their
experience. Since D Co. crews provide a much better
picture of Array aviation and aviators, and their perfor-
mance is within the design constraints, the selection of
pilots to fly the AH-64 does not have to be tied to a
magical number of time in service, total flight time, or
total attack helicopter time. Rather to the individual's
ability to perform within an attack helicopter unit. The
necessary ingredients to successfully operate the AH-6U is
the ability to think of the machine as an extension of the
aviator. It is true, as the test proved, the greater the
experience and exposure to the system the better the
performance level. However, the Army does not have the
luxury of having a multitude of DTTD experienced aviators;
hence, our choice must be made from the population on hand.
As indicated, D Co. crews are typical of that population
and thus provide a basis for the selection process.
With this in mind we can conclude that aircrew members
should be AH-1 qualified pilots who have performed well in
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attack helicopter units. This will provide a basis for the
tactical employment experience necessary to effectively
employ the AH-64. It is also apparent that the copilot
gunner should be the more experienced crew member ; which is







Total Hel Total Combat
Fit Hrs Hel Fit Hrs
Med Means Med Means
AH-1S crew 1050 1753 342
N=12




AH-1 IP/SIP 2614 2662 497 565
1981, N=292
















22 301 450 998
AH-1 IP/SIP
1981, N=292
577 769 1010 1 114
AH-64 Aircrew 657
N = 12




Total Flight Hours Comparison



















.01 < p < .05

























.01 < P < .05
«« Significant .001 < P < .01




Total Rotary Wing Instructor Pilot Flight Hours
AH-1S Aircrew









M.S. Not Significant, p > .05
Significant, .01 < p < .05
Significant, .001 < p < .01




MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS (DAY TRIALS)
Table 1
Simulated HMMS Autonomous Launches (day trial)
Information MDIS (a) df (e) % Var a (b)











Valley 8.446 1 18.51 .0037
Goodness-of-fit 25.91 1 5 43.32
Crew 13.411 1 29.29 .0003



































(a) The MDIS is the minimum Discrimination information
statistic which is distributed asymptotically as a chi-
square statistic.
(b) a is the critical level of the test, the level at which
the null hypothesis may be rejected.
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c) The hypothesis may be stated: The data is uniformly
( distributed
.
d) The goodness-of-fit term describes how well the model
predicts the values in the table.
e) DF indicated the degrees of freedom used in evaluating
the MDI3 statistic.
f) The data compiled in this table consists of all valid





Data for Table 1 presented in both numerical count and
percent of total calculated across trial.













Data for Table 1 presented in both numerical count and
percent of total calculated across valley
Valley GsibiLlan Nacimienibo
number perce nt number £1srcent
Success 76 68 28 47
Failure 35 32 32 53




Data for Table 1 presented in both numerical count and














Data for Table 1 presented in both numerical count and
percent of total, broken down by Valley and Crew
Valley GcjbiLlan




Success ng 92 27 ^7
Failure 4 8 31 53














Data for Table 1 presented in both numerical count and
percent of total broken down by Trial, Valley, and Crew
Trial
Valley
30 July 1981 and Before
Gabilan
Crew DTTD D Co.
number % number %
Success 10 100 15 38
Failure 24 62
Total 10 100 39 100
Valley Nacimien to
Success 1 20 9 43
Failure 4 80 12 57
Total 5 100 21 100
After 30 July 1981
Valley Gab:Llan
Success 39 91 12 63
Failure 4 9 7 37
Total 43 100 19 100
Valley Nacimiento
Success 6 67 12 48
Failure 3 33 13 52














Representation of the Valley versus Cre-/ interaction










O DTTD Crev/s Gabilan
X DTTD Crews Nacimiento
^ D Co Crev;s Gabilan





Representation of the Trial versus Valley versus Crev;
interaction and percent of simulated autonomous HMMS




MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTINGENCY TABLES (NIGHT TRIALS)
Table 1
Multidimensional contingency table analysis of valley by
crew and successful autonomous HMMS launches for all valid
night trials
Information MDIS (a) df (e)









(a) The MDIS is the minimum Discrimination information
statistic which is distributed asymptotically as a
chi-square statistic.
(b) a. is the critical level of the test, the level at
which the null hypothesis may be rejected.
(c) The hypothesis may be stated: The data is uniformly
distributed
.
(d) The goodness-of-fit term describes how well the model
predicts the values in the table.
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(e) DF indicated the degrees of freedom used in evaluating
the MDIS statistic.
(f) The data compiled in this table consists of all valid





Data for Table 1 presented in numerical count and percent
of total, broken down as Trial by Valley and Crew
•Valley Gabi Ian
Crew DTTD D Co •
number £ercen t number £ercent
Success 11 100 14 56
Failure 11 44
Total 11 100 25 100
Valley Nacimiento
Crew DTTD D Co.
number percent number percent
Success 28 88 22 96
Failure 4 12 14




Data for Table 1 presented in numerical count and percent













Data for Table 1 presented in numerical count and percent
of the total, broken down by crew
Crew DTTD D Co
number percent number percent
Success 39 91 36 75
Failure 4 9 12 25












Gabilon Nac i miento
Representation o£ the Valley versus Crew interaction
and percent of simulated autonomous ffifflS successful













y = .31+.00013 X
1600 2^0 2^00 34*00 4obo 46'00
Hours
Relationship between average total crew flight hours and









y =.42 +.0001 X
600 1600 2600 3600 4600 5600
Hours
RelationshiD between copilot gunner total flight hours
and











400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
AK-1 Hours
Relationship between tlie pilots total flight hours in















400 1200 2000 2800 3600 4200
AH-l Hours
Relationship between the copilot gunners total flight
hours in AK-1 series attack helicopters and % of













Relationship between total crew flight hours in the
AH-64 prior to the test and the 'i o£ successful











Relationship between copilot gunner total flight hours









Trial Valley 12 3 4
024 N 0/2
026 G 1/3 0/1
101 G 4/4 3/4
103 G 6/6 5/8
108 G 4/5
109 G 4/6
110 N 1/2 0/3
111 N 5/6 2/7
112 N 1/4 2/2
113 G 2/9
115 N 4/5 1/2 0/1
116 N 2/4 2/4 0/1
117 N 2/8 7/9
118 G 5/5 2/7
119 G 5/7 1/1
120 G 15/16 4/6
123 G 14/15 5/5
126 G 6/9 5/9
127 G 12/12 2/5
129 N 13/13 14/18 2/3
130 N 6/10 3/11
Legend :
(1) Data reflects MOE of # Success/// Success + # Failures
(2) Early trials are 113 and before and later trials are
after trail 113-
(3) N denotes Nacimiento valley






Hq - There is no difference between the proportion of
crew successes in the early trials versus the
later trials.
H^ - The proportion of successes in later trials is










N = A+B+C+D = 169




_IUIAD - BC L - N/2)- .
(A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D) ^'^^
Prob (x > 4.56/Hq) = Prob < .05
5. Decision
Since Prob < » = . 1 Reject Hq in favor of H-
6. Conclusion
Therefore the proportion of successes in later trials






SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEEFICIENT
1. Hypothesis
Hq - Crew performance and copilot gunner time in
service are not associated.
H^ - Crew performance and copilot gunner time in
service are associated positively.
2. Data








3. Significance Level - .1




= —^r^— - = 17.5
zy^ = 17.5
Spearman Rank -2 „ 2 -^2









A 2 -.22 /zx zy




Since Prob < « = .1 we can reject Hq and accept the
hypothesis that performance and copilot gunner time in
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